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A he last day of 1990 was an important
date for sports franchises. It had nothing
to do with opening day, a national cham-
pionship, or a players' draft, but for sev-
eral cities it appeared to determine
whether they would be able to retain or to
attract a major-league sports team. De-
cember 31, 1990 marked the expiration
of a provision in the federal tax code
granting federal tax exemption to the
debt issued by specific local governments
to finance sports facilities.
The final week of 1990 consequently
saw last-minute debt issues passed to
fund publicly supported stadiums in
three cities: In St. Louis, $72.4 million
of tax-exempt bonds were issued to
finance a downtown hockey arena com-
plex. In Denver, $55 million of bonds
were issued for a stadium to be built if
the city wins a major-league baseball
franchise this year. In Cleveland, where
$148 million of bonds were issued for
construction of a new baseball stadium
and basketball arena, county voters ap-
proved a hotly debated "sin" tax on al-
cohol and tobacco products as part of
the funding plan.
The success of publicly funded stadi-
ums within metropolitan areas is uncer-
tain, depending on future attendance
levels and on the magnitude of indirect
benefits, such as relocation of new busi-
nesses to the area. Proponents of such
stadiums claim that without the neces-
sary local support, teams might choose
to relocate and their cities would lose
employment, tax revenues, and other
indirect benefits. Opponents claim that
these benefits are probably overstated
and the likely future costs understated,
making probable the need for even
more public support in the future. Other
elements of the debate include the emo-
tional attachment of fans to their teams
and contentions about assessment of the
costs and benefits of these projects.
There is yet another perspective on the
costs and benefits of constructing sports
facilities: financing arrangements. A key
element of the funding plans is the
exemption from federal and most state
and local income tax of interest earn-
ings on qualified municipal securities
(munis) that could be issued to finance
these stadiums. The borrower can then
sell bonds at a lower interest rate than if
the interest were taxed. Debates about
the proposed stadiums occasionally
mentioned that the year-end 1990 dead-
line was related to the expiration of pro-
visions in the federal tax code that
would reduce funding costs, but the im-
plications of this exemption were
generally not discussed.
This Economic Commentary presents
the arguments for and against this hid-
den subsidy, discussing the mechanism
through which the income tax exemp-
tion reduces local funding costs and
how this is related to the distribution of
benefits from the exemption. Possible
rationales for public subsidies of sports
stadiums are introduced, along with a
historical perspective on federal tax ex-
emptions on interest from bonds used
to finance primarily public activities.
Finally, the article discusses how cur-
rent limitations on the volume of tax-
exempt municipal bonds make this
The use of municipal debt issues to
fund sports stadiums has been the
focus of much debate, but an often-
overlooked part of the story is the
role of federal tax exemption in
financing private, local facilities. Is
this hidden subsidy necessary, or
even desirable?
form of federal subsidy to local govern-
ments more similar to direct federal
subsidies, which in theory are more
cost effective.
• Tax Exemption and Finance Costs
Stadium projects are large, complex
ventures that are costly to construct
and consequently involve the financial
backing of many parties. Local govern-
ments typically become involved by
issuing tax-exempt bonds to finance
these projects. Until the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA 1986), local govern-
ments could issue tax-exempt bonds
for many private-purpose activities, in-
cluding sports facilities, residential
home mortgages, and industrial and
commercial enterprises. TRA 1986
eliminated this provision for many pri-
vate activities and extended the tax-
exempt status of a few proposed proj-
ects, such as Cleveland's Gateway
complex, until the end of 1990.
Tax-exempt status for these stadium proj-
ects substantially reduces their financing
costs. The spread between tax-exempt
bonds and equivalent taxable securities
averaged 2.33 percentage points during
ISSN 0428-12761990. For a project the size of Gateway,
which issued $148 million in tax-exempt
bonds, a reduction in the interest rate of 2
or more percentage points could result in
substantial savings.
Borrowing costs are lower on tax-
exempt bonds because investors who are
concerned about after-tax rates of return
are willing to accept a lower interest
rate on the munis. By definition, mar-
ginal investors are indifferent between
investing an additional dollar in taxable
or in tax-exempt securities. The tax rate
for these investors is the one relevant
for determining yields on munis. For
example, suppose that the effective tax
rate of the marginal investor is 25 per-
cent, which according to Moody's Bond
Survey was the break-even marginal
tax rate in 1990. If the taxable interest
rate, as determined by the national bond
market, on an alternative investment of
equivalent risk is 10 percent, then the
rate that the muni must bear can be cal-
culated as (1 -0.25) (10 percent) = 7.5
percent. This shows that the federal tax
exemption to particular categories of
municipal finance reduces financing
costs by an amount directly related to
the tax rate of marginal investors.
The lower borrowing costs to local gov-
ernment are not without costs to some-
one, however. For the federal govern-
ment, the cost is reduced revenue from
income tax collections. Using the sim-
ple example above, for every $100
invested in tax-exempt rather than tax-
able bonds, the federal government
receives $25 less in revenues. For the
state government, the revenue loss is
also directly tied to the effective state
tax rate of the marginal investor. Conse-
quently, both federal and state govern-
ments are effectively subsidizing the
projects of local governments.
This relationship between taxable and
nontaxable interest rates implies that
the distribution of benefits from invest-
ing in munis is directly related to the in-
dividual investor's marginal tax rate.
The marginal investor, who determines
the market rate for nontaxable securities
(munis), just breaks even by investing
in munis instead of taxable securities,
and is thus indifferent between the two.
However, an investor in a higher tax
bracket receives, in effect, a bonus for
investing in munis.
This additional benefit is depicted in
figure 1, which shows the relationship
between the quantity of municipal debt
outstanding and the yield spread be-
tween tax-exempt and taxable securi-
ties. In this case, the demand for munis
is the curve labeled D. It slopes upward
because as the yield spread narrows, in-
dividuals in progressively lower tax
brackets become indifferent between
the two types of securities.
Consider point e, where the demand
curve intersects the vertical axis. Here,
investors would be indifferent between
a nontaxable security yielding 6.5 per-
cent and a taxable one yielding 10 per-
cent if they were in the 35-percent tax
bracket. Marginal investors at d, where
demand equals the fixed supply of
munis (depicted by M), would be indif-
ferent between taxable and nontaxable
securities when the interest rate is 7.5
percent, the market rate for the nontax-
able security. Therefore, investors in
the 35-percent tax bracket, who would
have purchased a muni at 6.5 percent,
would actually receive a yield 1.0 per-
centage points higher than what was
necessary to induce them to invest in
munis. They would effectively receive
a bonus, which could also be construed
as an additional tax break.
Federal income tax collections at e are
lower by this same amount. For inves-
tors in slightly lower tax brackets, who
would be located on the demand curve
to the right of investor e, the "bonus" is
slightly less, making the tax losses less,
but still significant. The result of this
bonus is that while the local govern-
ment receives a subsidy from the fed-
eral government of the magnitude rep-
resented by the area abed, the cost to
the federal government in forgone
revenue is ebed.
The cost to the federal government over
and above the amount of the subsidy (the
triangle ead) represents the inefficiency
in this type of government subsidy. The
actual magnitude of this inefficiency
depends on the range of federal tax
rates above that of the marginal inves-
tor. For individuals, who hold 42.4 per-
cent of tax-exempt securities, the effec-
tive tax rate of the highest bracket was
31.5 percent in 1990—6.4 percentage
points above the break-even marginal
tax rate computed by Moody's. For cor-
porations, which hold 32.8 percent of
these bonds, the effective tax rate was
34 percent.
Recent estimates by the Joint Tax Com-
mittee show that this inefficiency
amounted to about $ 18.1 billion in
1990. In comparison, the fiscal year
1992 budget indicates that aid to state
and local governments in the form of
tax exemptions for both public and pri-
vate bonds is equivalent to approxi-
mately $25 billion in outlays. This
amount is significant, but it pales in
comparison to total federal grants-in-
aid to state and local governments of
$522.4 billion in 1990.
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The implicit suggestion is that instead
of granting exemptions for categories
of activities—no matter how clearly de-
fined—Congress should rely on block
grants to directly limit federal expendi-
tures. In fact, based on our discussion
of the relation between tax exemption
and finance costs, an argument can be
made that direct subsidies from the fed-
eral to the state government are more
efficient than tax exemption. Nonethe-
less, direct federal aid has not kept
pace with local demand for financing
capital projects.
• A Social Benefit Rationale?
Lower finance costs obviously increase
the likely profits of stadium projects,
but it is far from clear that the realloca-
tion of funds is socially desirable. Why
should taxpayers from areas outside St.
Louis, Denver, or Cleveland help to
subsidize a new sports facility? If a sta-
dium would not be built without the
subsidy, reducing the cost to the tax-
exempt interest rate, the predicted rate
of return must have been insufficient to
justify borrowing at the higher taxable
interest rate. The funds directed toward
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elsewhere, earning at least the equiva-
lent taxable interest rate. Consequently,
not only are outside taxpayers subsidiz-
ing these local projects, but the tax-
exempt status of bonds also shifts funds
from projects earning at least the tax-
able rate to those earning the lower
nontaxable rate. This implies that at
least the private benefits, incorporated
into the predicted rate of return, have
been reduced as a result of the subsidy.
One possible rationale for subsidizing
sports stadiums is that their benefits ex-
tend beyond those generated solely by
attendance at games and the revenues
associated with actual sporting events.
Many contend that sports stadiums yield
externalities that indirectly benefit the
broader communities in which they are
located. The presence of a stadium may
enhance a locale's attractiveness to busi-
nesses or to prospective residents. If so,
one could justify that at least local resi-
dents, regardless of whether they actually
attend an event, should pay some of the
costs of the facility.
This argument makes sense only if the
social benefit pertains to the subsidizing
jurisdiction. For example, if the city of
Cleveland stood to benefit from a new
stadium more than its private developers
could, then it might be logical for the
city (through its taxpayers) to subsidize
the stadium as long as the amount of
the benefit that could not be realized
solely by private parties exceeded the
loss from the reallocation of resources
from privately productive activities.
Similarly, if the state of Ohio benefited
as a whole (possibly at the expense of
other states), then it might make sense
for the state to subsidize the stadium.
However, it is less plausible that the
country as a whole would profit, since
part of the benefit to a locality may be
at the expense of other municipalities
or states. In this view, a federal tax sub-
sidy makes no sense.
• Public versus Private Activities
Interest earned on the bonds of states
and their political subdivisions, such as
municipalities and counties, was initially
excluded from federal taxable income
in 1913. A surge in the issuance of
municipal debt starting in the 1960s led
to increased scrutiny of the activities
being financed. As a result, the extent of
subsidization of "private-purpose"
bonds via tax exemption has been cur-
tailed over time.
Although estimates of private versus
public bonds have been compiled only
recently, the relative growth of revenue
bonds, such as those used to finance
these stadium projects, compared with
general obligation bonds is noteworthy.
General obligation (GO) bonds are
those that will be paid back through the
taxing power of the issuing authority.
These bonds are typically used to
finance traditional capital projects such
as highways, roads, and sewers.
Revenue bonds are paid back from the
revenues generated by the specific proj-
ect. While GO bonds generally corres-
pond to public-purpose bonds and reve-
nue bonds to private-purpose bonds,
some public projects may be financed
with revenue bonds. However, the GO/
revenue distinction is inadequate to
determine which activities deserve this
particular type of subsidy.
The Revenue and Expenditure Control
Act of 1968 was the first of many laws
to curtail the use of revenue bonds. It
stated that if 25 percent or more of the
project's proceeds went to private busi-
ness or if 25 percent or more of the
debt's security backing was used in trade
or business, then the debt issue would
be deemed private and ineligible for tax
exemption. These revenue bonds were
labeled taxable industrial development
bonds (IDBs). TRA 1986 reduced that
threshold to 10 percent.
Such arbitrary percentages still do not
correspond to the external benefits as-
sociated with such projects, however.
As a result, Congress has created dis-
tinct classes of activities for which "tax-
exempt IDBs" may be issued. The Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, for example, prohibited the use
of tax-exempt issues for golf courses,
country clubs, massage parlors, hot tub
and suntan facilities, racetracks, and
racquet sports facilities.
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repealed prior exemptions for conven-
tion and trade show facilities, parking
garages, sports arenas, air and water pol-
lution control facilities, and industrial
park IDBs. However, numerous excep-
tions have been made through the yearly
transition rules attached to the federal
budget. Tax-exempt financing for the
three stadiums previously mentioned
are made possible by such extensions.
Two recent developments illustrate the
extent to which such provisions in the
federal tax code may be directed at spe-
cific facilities. In Cleveland, the
planned baseball stadium, financed
with tax-exempt issues, will ultimately
become the property of the city. How-
ever, local legislators intend to request
that the federal tax code be changed sothat the basketball arena portion of the
Gateway complex, financed with tax-
able bond issues, would also become
public property. In Detroit, local offi-
cials have considered asking for transi-
tion rules to allow tax-exempt debt
finance for a new baseball stadium.
In addition, Congress has sought to con-
trol the extent of these subsidies by re-
stricting the total amount of tax-exempt
private-activity debt for each state. Cur-
rently, the ceiling is the maximum of
$150 million or $50 per person per state.
This cap helps to limit the total amount
of federal "tax expenditures" associated
with the subsidy.
6 Preliminary evi-
dence indicates that volume caps on
private-activity bonds may be reason-
ably successful in controlling these tax
expenditures. Without such restrictions,
the extent of the federal subsidy implied
by tax exemption would be limited only
by how much borrowing localities
chose to undertake.
• Conclusion
The controversies generated by last-
minute municipal debt issues to fund
sports stadiums have focused on local
costs and benefits. However, the im-
plications of the federal tax exemption
provided to such debt issues have not
been the focus of much attention. This
article points out a number of problems
with this exemption. First, it benefits
those in relatively high tax brackets, in-
terfering with tax equity. Second, even
if one could argue that sports stadiums
provide benefits beyond simply hous-
ing sporting events, it is difficult to con-
tend that these benefits extend much
beyond the local community and are
deserving of a federal subsidy.
Third, direct subsidy is more efficient
than tax exemption. In fact, the diffi-
culty in separating public-purpose from
private-purpose activities has led to lim-
itations on the overall volume of federal
tax exemption of private-activity bonds.
This limits the inefficiency of the sys-
tem of exemptions. However, as federal
aid from other sources lags the invest-
ment needs of local governments, and
as cities are expected to increase their
responsibilities in light of federal pro-
gram cutbacks, local governments have
strong incentives to seek the subsidies
embodied in tax-exempt financing.
• Footnotes
1. These figures are from the Federal
Reserve System's end-of-year Flow of Funds
Account balance sheet data for 1989. Corpo-
rations include commercial banks and insur-
ance companies other than life insurance
firms. Also see Moody's Bond Survey,
selected years.
2. See Budget of the United States Govern-
ment, Fiscal Year 1992, Washington, D.C.:
Office of Management and Budget, part in, p.
37, and part I, p. 21. The inefficiency estimate
is from Estimates of Federal Tax Expendi-
tures for Fiscal Years 1991-1995, U.S. Con-
gress, Joint Committee on Taxation, 1990.
3. Of course, if other localities can offer
competitive subsidies, the overall terms ob-
tained by any one locality are likely to suffer.
4. See Dennis Zimmerman, The Private Use
ofTax-Exempt Bonds: Controlling Public Sub-
sidy of Private Activity, Washington, D.C.:
The Urban Institute Press, 1991, pp. 182-84.
5. SezThe Plain Dealer, Cleveland, Ohio,
November 30, 1990, p. Al; and "Issuing
Bonds for a Stadium in Michigan Being Con-
sidered Despite 1986 Tax Law," MuniWeek,
vol. 3, no. 10 (March 11, 1991), p. 8.
6. A detailed review of recent experience
with the volume caps can be found in Dennis
Zimmerman, "The Volume Cap for Tax-
Exempt Private Activity Bonds: State and
Local Experience in 1989," Washington, D.C.:
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, July 1990.
7. Other concerns include the impact on the
cost of overall state and local finance, and
any influence on the overall productivity of
the capital stock.
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